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FORUM
Mental Health Laws in Oklahoma:
Who Needs Commitment?
M.M. McDougal*
Having presided over some twenty-five hundred mental health cases
during the last six and one-half years, the writer is convinced that
Oklahoma judges and lawyers need to be committed. Committed, that is,
to protect individuals who are alleged to be mentally ill and in need of
treatment, and committed to protect society.
Protection is not a one-way proposition. Any person who is mental-
ly ill and in need of treatment, needs to be protected from harm, be it
self-inflicted or otherwise. Society needs protection from overt physical
danger, and protection from losing any of its productive members. All
persons need to be protected in their constitutionally guaranteed rights so
that no person will be committed to an institution, or even involuntarily
treated in a less restrictive manner, without due process of law.
Giant strides have been taken in the past few years toward accepting
mental illness as being treatable and in developing methods of treatment.
Although there still remain a great number of patients who cannot be
"cured," Eastern State Hospital, at Vinita, Oklahoma, now reports that
the average in-patient time has been reduced to less than thirty days. This
is certainly an improvement over the system which prevailed only a few
years ago, when a patient could expect to wait months, or even years,
before any type of release. Notwithstanding motion pictures and televi-
sion productions, the general public seems to have accepted the fact that
treatment facilities are no longer "snake pits," and that mental illness is
a true illness. Courts and legislatures have made progress, too. Many
states have remodeled their statutes and procedures to provide safeguards
which historically have been ignored. Court decisions have recognized
* District Judge, 14th Judicial District, Tulsa, Oklahoma.
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this long-forgotten group by requiring both the medical and legal
communities to protect and treat patients more humanely.
In keeping with this change of attitude, the Oklahoma Legislature
amended the Oklahoma Mental Health Law in 1975,1 and again in 1977,2
with emphasis on involuntary commitment procedures.3 The intent was
to improve statutory authority for involuntary treatment of persons who
do not recognize their need for treatment, or who refuse to accept needed
treatment, while still ensuring the protection of all human and legal rights
as guaranteed by our state and federal constitutions. The challenge of
balancing the needs and rights of all who are involved in mental health
matters tests the ingenuity of any draftsman. The age-old question of
Cain, who asked, "Am I my brother's keeper?" is a valid question
today. What do we owe an individual who becomes mentally ill to such
an extent that he is unable to function productively in society? Who
determines the level of productivity that is acceptable? Is the state
obligated to assume a parental position under a parens patriae theory
regardless of the desires or objections of the subject individual? To what
degree should the family of a mentally ill person be assured of treatment
for that person, merely because of their love and compassion for him?
How dangerous must one be before society has a right of protection
paramount to the individual's right to freedom? Towards whom must the
danger exist? Should the determination of mental illness rest on medical
or legal standards?
Obviously, these questions comprise only the visible tips of an
enormois iceberg. Several federal district courts have rendered decisions
dealing with numerous substantive and procedural questions. Although
not having controlling precedential effect in this jurisdiction, they repre-
sent a nation-wide trend which can be observed. One of the most
comprehensive decisions was in the case of Suzuki v. Quisenberry4
which delineates most of the safeguards to be considered in determining
1. Act of June 12, 1975, ch. 355, §§ 1, 2, 1975 Okla. Sess. Laws 666 (amending the
statutes now found at OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, §§ 54.1, 55.2 (Supp. 1977)).
2. Act of June 3, 1977, ch. 145, §§ 3, 4, 12, 1977 Okla. Sess. Laws 371 (amending the
statutes now found at OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, §§ 54.1, 55.2 (Supp. 1977)).
3. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, §§ 54.1, 55.2 (Supp. 1977).
4. 411 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Haw. 1976). This case found the following procedural
safeguards required by the due process clause in connection with the nonemergency,
nonconsensual commitment of persons pursuant to mental health laws: adequate prior
notice; prior hearing before a neutral judicial officer; the right to effective counsel; the
right to be present at the hearing; right to confront witnesses and offer evidence; adher-
ence to the rules of evidence used in criminal proceedings; the privilege against self-
incrimination; a record of the proceedings; appellate review; consideration of the least
restrictive alternative; and periodic review of the basis for confinement. Id. at 1127.
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whether the requirements of due process have been satisfied. The United
States Supreme Court has also entered some landmark decisions in the
past few years. Possibly the most famous, O'Connor v. Donaldson,5
dealt with the power of a state to confine a person for mental illness and
the right to treatment upon confinement. The effect of this decision has
been diluted somewhat because a settlement ended litigation after the
case was remanded for reconsideration of money damages.
Following Oklahoma's 1977 amendments, many new procedures
and practices have developed. It is hoped that a discussion of these
procedures and practices, as they are interpreted and used in Tulsa
County, may emphasize the areas of the law which have been improved
and help point out problems which still exist in Oklahoma.
Any peace officer may now take an individual into "protective
custody" and hold him under emergency detention, without first obtain-
ing a court order. 6 The officer must execute an affidavit setting forth the
grounds for such detention, which may be based upon personal observa-
tion, or upon the affidavit of some third person. The individual must be
examined by a doctor within twelve hours, and if the doctor endorses the
officer's affidavit, the individual may be held in a medical facility for a
period not to exceed forty-eight hours. If a petition is filed within that
time limit alleging that the individual is a "person requiring treatment," 7
regular proceedings will commence and the individual may be detained
longer by order of the court. If no petition has been filed within the
specified time limit, the individual must be released.
The petition may be filed, with or without the "protective custody"
procedure, by certain family members or other specific individuals,8
asking the district court to determine whether a person is a "person
requiring treatment." The court must immediately appoint two qualified
examiners to examine the person, 9 and an attorney to represent him.10
The attorney must meet and confer with the person within one day of
such appointment, and he will represent the individual throughout all
proceedings unless replaced by privately employed counsel under order
of the court. The court also will enter an order setting the time and place
of the examination and of the court hearing. Notice will be issued and
5. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
6. OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 54.1(A)(2).
7. Id. at § 3(s).
8. Id. at § 54.1 (A)(1).
9. Id. at § 55.2(a).
10. Id. at § 55.2(b).
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served personally upon the subject individual and upon certain specified
persons and relatives. 1
Detention pending examination is rather indefinite under the lan-
guage of the statute.12 A literal reading indicates that a detention order
may be issued by the court, based on clear and convincing evidence, after
the Examining Commission has executed a certificate of its findings.
Such an interpretation negates any benefit to be obtained by detention.
No difficulties have been encountered in holding a person for a court
hearing following an examination by the commission. The difficulty is in
ensuring his appearance at the examination, without permitting the per-
son to harm himself or others, after receiving his notice of examination
and court hearing. In Tulsa County, detention orders are issued at the
time the petition is filed if necessity is shown. The court requires the
sworn affidavit of a doctor or a peace officer, or the personal appearance
and testimony of another individual, that clearly shows the necessity of
detention. A medical facility must be used for detention unless there is a
criminal charge pending against the person. In Tulsa, the Tulsa Psychiat-
ric Center is used whenever possible, with Eastern State Hospital as an
alternative place of detention. There have been objections to an interpre-
tation of legislative intent that permits pre-examination detention, but
there has yet been no appellate review of these objections.
Examinations are held at any medical facility where the person may
be, or at the County Courthouse, but never in a courtroom or jail. The
Examining Commission is required to obtain certain information for a
statutory report and certificate.13 They may consider any information
coming before them, including statements by the petitioner or other
persons appearing at the examination. The statute refers to "testimony
under oath,"' 4 but this is waived as impractical to administer. The
attorney must attend the examination and ensure that the rights of his
client are fully protected, but he is instructed not to interfere with the
examination. Any objections or motions may be presented to the court
after the examination has been completed. The reports of the examiners
11. Id. at § 54.1(B)(8) (requiring that notice be served upon the parent, spouse, or in
their absence, the next of kin, and the person with whom the subject resides).
12. Id. at § 55.2(a) provides in part that:
By virtue of the petition, certificate and a showing of both probable cause and
urgent need of custody and treatment, the person alleged to be a person requiring
treatment may be received and detained in a suitable medical facility prior to the
hearing on the petition; provided that said period of temporary detention shall not
exceed seventy-two hours, excluding Saturdays, legal holidays and other days
when the district court is not in session.
13. See id. at § 55.2(c), (d).
14. Id. at § 55.2(c).
1977]
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should include sufficient explanation to enable the court to determine the
"least restrictive alternative for treatment which is appropriate." 5 For
the first time, out-patient treatment may now be ordered, giving the court
a most important tool. Until the 1977 amendments, there were only two
possible orders: commitment and confinement in a hospital; or dismissal
and release without treatment.
The alleged "person requiring treatment" has two choices if the
examiners determine that he does require treatment. He may accept the
diagnosis and recommendation of the examiners and submit to treatment;
or, he may request a trial by jury. Non-jury trials are not conducted; it
would seem incongruous for a judge to appoint two "qualified examin-
ers" and then question their opinions and recommendation by conducting
a non-jury trial. The deliberations and decision of a jury remove the
possibility or even the appearance of judicial bias.
Juries are selected in the same manner and from the same panel as
for other cases. Five concurring jurors may render a verdict. The trial is
conducted under the Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 except the burden is on
the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual is a
person requiring treatment. 17 Witnesses for the state and for the respond-
ent, including the respondent, may be called, examined, and cross-
examined as in other civil cases. On this basis, there can be no justifica-
tion for a right to remain silent, such as exists in criminal proceedings.
Also, what better witness could the examiners or jury have than the
respondent himself? The state is represented by the district attorney, but
until the present time his participation has been limited to actual trials. It
is anticipated that in the near future he will assume his statutory role of
interviewing petitioners and preparing petitions.' 8
If the respondent is found, by the jury, to be a person requiring
treatment, or upon his waiver of a jury trial, the court must consider and
select the least restrictive form of treatment which is appropriate.19 This
procedure presents a problem since the statutes do not define nor provide
any methods of enforcement. The best procedure, so far devised, is to
order out-patient treatment and to continue the case for some stated
period of time. If, at the end of that time, the treating agency reports that
the respondent has improved so that additional treatment is not required,
the case can be dismissed. If the report shows progress but additional
15. Id. at § 54.1 (F).
16. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1-1771 (1971 & Supp. 1977).
17. OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 54.1(C).
18. Id. at § 55.1.
19. Id. at § 54.1(F).
[Vol. 13:258
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treatment needed, the case can be continued for another period. Should
the respondent fail or refuse treatment, the court can then order commit-
ment in a hospital. A necessary part of such procedure is the consent of
the respondent and his attorney, and a waiver of any additional hearings
in the event of an unfavorable report from the treating agency. In five
attempts in Tulsa County, there have been two dismissals, two orders for
continued treatment with the cases passed to later dates, and one hospital
confinement.
In cases requiring hospitalization, relatives or friends may arrange
for treatment in a local private hospital which has facilities for the care
and treatment of the mentally ill.20 If such arrangements are not request-
ed, commitment will be in Eastern State Hospital at Vinita, Oklahoma.
Persons committed to the hospital will remain there until the super-
intendent determines that further hospitalization will not be beneficial.
The patient may be released under several elections available to the
superintendent. He may be released on convalescent leave, out-patient
aftercare, 21 or by discharge with a Certificate of Competency executed by
the superintendent. 22 If a patient is released on convalescent leave or out-
patient aftercare, he must be given a new hearing before he can be
returned to the hospital involuntarily. In Lewis v. Donohue,23 section 73
of title 43A was declared unconstitutional. The decision in Donohue
was apparently intended to invalidate only the lack of notice or opportu-
nity to be heard in the reinstitutionalization procedure so as to require a
totally new proceeding for commitment, almost as if the patient had
never been hospitalized.24 The language in Donohue, however, strikes
down the entire section as unconstitutional, leaving a question as to the
proper procedure for releasing a patient as well as for recommitting him.
An interpretation of the opinion may now be that the only manner in
which a patient may be released is under section 392 of title 43A; this
raises another problem. Sections 391 through 394, deal with discharging
a patient as mentally competent when there has been no determination of
mental incompetency. Is it possible that the federal court, in its zeal to
20. Id.
21. Id. at § 73.
22. Id. at § 392.
23. 437 F. Supp. 112 (W.D. Okla. 1977). This case involved a patient who had been
involuntarily committed to a state hospital, was placed on outpatient after-care status and
whose outpatient status was then revoked. The patient sought declaratory and injunctive
relief challenging the recommitment on the grounds that she had a constitutionally protect-
ed interest in her conditional liberty, and the statute providing for revocation of outpatient
or convalescent leave without notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to reinstitutionali-
zation denied her due process.
24. Id. at 114.
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protect against re-hospitalization under an already existing valid commit-
ment order, has eliminated all provisions for the release or discharge of
an involuntarily committed patient? Unless these uncertainties are re-
solved the system can be analyzed to have been better with the state
courts exercising a little discretionary authority.
More confusion exists because of the language in the amended
statute pertaining to competency32 In an effort to clarify rather hazy
language in the prior statute, the legislature provided that "[n]o person
admitted to any medical facility under a court order for treatment shall be
considered or presumed to be mentally or legally incompetent" 26 by such
admission. Legal competency, among other things, deals with one's
ability to contract, to vote, and to transact business; the legislature
intended to distinguish such competency from mental illness. One may
suffer from a particular type of mental illness, yet be fully competent to
handle his own affairs. It has been alleged that a patient, now presumed
to be competent, has a right to refuse treatment. In a recent case in Tulsa
County, it was held that the patient did not have the right to refuse, and
the hospital was ordered to proceed with treatment. Since that decision is
being appealed, it would be improper for the writer to discuss the matter
further.
Still more confusion has arisen over the newly enacted confidentiali-
ty provision which states that mental health records "shall be open to
public inspection only by order of the court to persons having a legitimate
interest therein." 27 Abstractors, in particular, have been affected. Under
a recent Attorney General opinion it now appears that abstractors have a
"legitimate interest,''28 and may have access to any cases filed prior to
June 3, 1977, since incompetency was a matter included in those cases.
Inasmuch as competency is no longer a part of mental health matters,29
there appears to be no need for abstractors to certify to such matters after
June 2, 1977, and they should now be allowed access only by special
order of the court.
In summary, many improvements have been included in the latest
amendments to Oklahoma's Mental Health Law. Some of the more
important improvements are:
1. Emergency detention procedures have been provided and
defined.30
25. OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 64 (Supp. 1977).
26. Id.
27. Id. at § 54.1 (H).
28. OKLA. ATTy. GEN. Op. 77-214, Oct. 24, 1977).
29. OKLA. STAT. tit. 43A, § 64 (Supp. 1977).
30. Id. at § 54.1(A)(2).
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2. The definition of a "mentally ill person" has been changed
to eliminate former vague and indefinite language. 31
3. The basis for commitment for treatment is that the indi-
vidual must be a "person requiring treatment"; a phrase that
has been defined to require some element of danger.32
5. The court may order treatment without confinement and
commitment to a hospital.33
6. Mental health court files are now confidential.34
Other major changes, which may be considered as improvements
are:
1. A person admitted for treatment does not necessarily lose
his competency.35
2. The burden of proof is now "beyond a reasonable
doubt.' '36
Some of the remaining problems are:
1. The provisions for detention prior to examination are
vague and incomplete. '
2. Time restrictions are too limited to be practical.38
3. The requirement for testimony to be given under oath at the
examination by the Examining Commission is impractical. 39
4. Provisions for enforcement of treatment other than
commitment are lacking.
5. The right to refuse treatment by reason of competency, is
questionable under present language. 4°
6. The expense of detaining persons in medical facilities and
transporting them to and from such facilities is an ongoing
problem.
7. The problems of convalescent leave, out-patient treatment
and re-commitment remain unanswered.
Hopefully these problems will be solved in some future legislative
session, but in spite of these weaknesses, Oklahoma can be proud of
having one of the best Mental Health Laws in the nation, providing
generally adequate protection for the individual and for society.
31. Id. at § 3(c).
32. Id. at § 3(s).
33. Id. at § 54.1(F).
34. Id. at § 54.1(H).
35. Id. at § 64.
36. Id. at § 54.1(c).
37. Id. at § 55.2(a).
38. Id. at § 54.1(c), 55.2(b).
39. Id. at § 55.2(c).
40. Id. at § 64.
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